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Sustainable trade

Understanding the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism


Published 07 November 2023

The first of its kind in the world, the CBAM is poised to force businesses to re-evaluate their supply chain strategies and operations. In this primer, Hinrich Foundation Research Manager Mekhla Jha explains how the mechanism works, what it means for global trade flows, and how businesses can prepare for it.

The European Union (EU) last month put into effect its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), kicking off a two-year transitional phase that would require EU-based importers of goods covered by the mechanism to report embedded carbon emissions of imports. Starting from 2026, CBAM certificates would effectively price carbon embedded throughout the production process of the imported goods and charge a levy on them at European borders based on their emissions footprint.

The first of its kind in the world, the CBAM took root when the EU adopted an important climate change policy known as the Emissions Trading System (ETS) in 2005. The ETS is a market-based system that aims at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by allowing emitters to buy and sell these emissions among themselves. Annual caps on emissions are placed under this system and emissions permits are traded within this cap. 

While this system works well for its domestic industries, emissions embedded in products imported from other countries are not accounted for under this mechanism. If emissions are not as stringently taxed in the countries of origin of the imported goods, the EU worried that the loophole puts its domestic producers at a disadvantage. The EU first sought to alleviate this concern by allowing affected carbon-intensive industries in the EU to receive free allowances or permits under the ETS.

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Figure 1: EU CBAM Timeline

Many European companies in carbon-intensive industries, like others around the world, are naturally inclined to relocate their carbon-intensive production to countries with less stringent climate rules, a phenomenon termed carbon leakage.  

To address these challenges and to make the EU ETS more robust, the EU put its CBAM measures in place to effectively globalize its climate policy.  

How will it work?  

The mechanism will initially apply to six carbon-intensive industries that are also considered to be at a higher risk of carbon leakage – cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen. Importers in these industries will enter a trial period starting October 2023 during which they will only have to report greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) embedded in their imports (direct and indirect emissions), without making any financial payments or adjustments. From 1 January 2026, importers will need to declare each year the quantity of goods imported into the EU in the preceding year and their embedded GHG, and then surrender the corresponding number of CBAM certificates. The price of these certificates will be calculated based on the weekly average auction price of EU ETS allowances expressed in euro (EUR) per metric ton of carbon dioxide emitted.

If suppliers are unable to provide the necessary emissions data to EU importers, and at the standard required by the EU, default emission data will be used. Using default factors could be more expensive than using primary data because the European Council will add a mark-up to CBAM certificates when default factors are used. Default factors will be based on the worst-performing production assets in the producer economy. This provision is of concern to economies that do not collect this level of data and will be unable to provide accurate CBAM reporting based on their specific suppliers and assets. Further implications of implementing CBAM on the EU’s trade partners are explored in the sections below.

Figure 2: EU CBAM Process

Figure 3: Global carbon prices (US$/t)

Is CBAM WTO-compliant? 

National Treatment Principle  

Article III: 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) states that, based on the national treatment principle, the WTO allows for border adjustments, and that WTO members must not accord discriminatory treatment between imports and “like” domestic products (except for the imposition of tariffs, which is a border measure). Therefore, under the CBAM (which is being applied as a border measure and not an internal tax), imports shall be treated no less favorably than like products in the EU. Even if it means that imported “dirtier” steel with higher embedded emissions and “cleaner” EU-manufactured steel are considered like products, the EU could use recent WTO rulings on technical barriers to trade that suggest that processes and production methods (PPMs) can be taken into account as a basis to differentiate between goods otherwise considered alike.  

While there appears to be legal basis for discrimination between EU imports and EU products – since CBAM certificates will be priced according to the weekly average auction price of EU ETS allowances, thus justifying a level charge per metric ton of carbon for both categories –the EU’s trading partners could counter-argue that the CBAM represents de facto discrimination. They could say that reporting requirements under the CBAM from 2023 onward will put imports on an unequal footing, as the legal due diligence requirements for foreign entities under CBAM are more stringent than the reporting requirements under the EU’s ETS.

Most favored nation 

Article I of the GATT provides for the most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) rule that underpins the global trading system, banning discrimination between like products imported from different countries of origin. The CBAM could be deemed discriminatory under MFN treatment. While the CBAM will apply to all non-EU trade partners, however, manufacturers in some countries will be better placed to meet the CBAM’s reporting and disclosure requirements. Imported like products estimated to have lower carbon-embedded emissions would surrender fewer certificates than those calculated to have higher embedded emissions. Additionally, the number of certificates can also be reduced if a carbon price has already been paid in the country of origin, such as in the case of Switzerland.

General exceptions 

GATT Article XX exempts measures from being considered WTO violations based on various domestic policy goals, including the protection of public morals. If all else fails, to make CBAM WTO-compliant, the EU may rely on this provision and argue that the CBAM regulations qualify for general exceptions (on the grounds of preservation of exhaustive resources or human health) per GATT Article XX. However, to qualify for Article XX, the EU must show that the CBAM is the only option that would allow it to protect health concerns and that it is the least trade-restrictive measure reasonably available. Most importantly, Article XX states that the CBAM regulation cannot be a disguised restriction on international trade. To rely on this provision, WTO rules require the EU to prove a “close and genuine” relationship between the border adjustment on imports and conservation goals. The fact that revenue generated from the CBAM will go to the EU budget may attract scrutiny. There have been suggestions to use the revenue generated to assist developing countries in meeting these countries’ clean energy goals.  

Impact on trade flows and economy 

Impact on Europe 

European trade flows – both imports and exports – will be affected by CBAM provisions. For exports, the subsequent elimination of free allowances will have a bearing on the export competitiveness of European downstream sectors. For imports, the extent of the impact will really depend on how carbon-intensive the EU’s trade partners are and whether they have meaningful measures in place to drive decarbonization in their industries, and how quickly they are able to do so.   

European consumers will face higher prices as imports become more expensive. As the allocation of free allowances to domestic sectors is gradually reduced, the phasing-in of CBAM will drive up costs for EU producers.  

Reporting obligations related to CBAM will also push up costs, to be eventually borne by consumers. Some of the immediate and direct impacts that EU companies may feel include higher import prices of goods from industries covered under the CBAM (e.g., steel) and increased prices of secondary goods that include components of such goods (e.g., vehicle manufacturers buying parts from another EU manufacturer that contain imported higher-priced steel or aluminum).  

Impact on trading partners 

The CBAM could have a significant impact on the competitiveness of countries that export these goods to the EU, particularly emerging and developing economies. The extent to which a country is affected by the CBAM depends on the EU ETS price, the severity of the CBAM’s impact, and on exporting countries’ exposure, i.e., the volume of their affected exports to the EU. However, exposure alone does not say much about possible economic risks. A more significant risk measure is vulnerability. Vulnerability measures economic dependency, export diversification, and export concentration, besides exposure alone.  

Some developing countries export large quantities of these goods to the EU. Zimbabwe, for example, is a major exporter of iron and steel to the EU, and Ukraine sells large quantities of fertilizer to the bloc.1 In absolute terms, Russia, China, Turkey, and Ukraine are the main EU trade partners in CBAM products, and hence the most exposed countries. In relative terms, the degree of exposure of economies that export CBAM products to Europe varies substantially, with many developing economies having more than 2% of their exports and 1% of their production impacted by this measure.2 Promoting the substitution of highly polluting technologies with green technologies, while arguably easier in economically advanced Europe, is not as feasible in developing and emerging economies. Many jobs and fiscal revenues are at risk if the CBAM is implemented without considering the specific contexts of the EU’s trading partners. 

Figure 4: Countries most exposed to the EU's CBAM

Expectedly, CBAM has triggered a backlash from several of the EU’s trading partners including the United States, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. It is viewed in China as a new tariff barrier. “If Europe imposes taxes based on the [carbon] price differences on relevant products from China, it may have a very large impact on China’s related industries and enterprises,” Zhou Chengjun, director of the Financial Research Institute of the People’s Bank of China, said at an academic forum in Beijing in July3. Others have also expressed concerns that the new rules will further complicate trade and raise export costs for non-EU manufacturers.  

The EU’s trading partners might choose to retaliate and impose barriers on EU imports in response. Some like China and India could further challenge this policy at the WTO. China has already asked the EU to justify its incoming carbon border tax at the WTO. India plans to file a complaint to the WTO over the EU's proposal to levy imports of high-carbon goods like steel, iron ore, and cement from India, top government and industry sources say4. India has set up its own carbon trading system and brought in a series of measures and norms to push high-emission industries towards decarbonization to “mitigate the impact” of the CBAM5.

Impact on businesses 

Non-EU companies will have to employ carbon accounting to track the embedded emissions associated with these products and independently verify these embedded emissions. This is an added compliance burden that can prove very challenging for small and medium enterprises in developing economies that must first understand the complex legislation and pay a hefty price for their exports that don’t meet advanced decarbonization standards set by the EU. Additionally, supply chain disruptions may occur if imported goods are stopped at the border due to CBAM-related challenges in meeting requirements.

The CBAM is in its initial phase and may grow to include Scope 2 emissions and additional targeted industries and covered commodities. This means downstream products that undergo complex manufacturing processes and finished products (e.g., white goods).6 Businesses must start adapting to the changes already underway. Among the most urgent compliance requirements is the adherence to reporting obligations from 1 January 2023. Businesses must report the embedded emissions in the imported goods every quarter (during that quarter of the calendar year), detailing the direct and indirect emissions and any carbon price effectively paid in the country of origin. Some other key considerations7 for businesses are:  

  1. Review the global supply chain to determine the potential impact of the CBAM. 
  2. Check if their product is on the list (Annex I of the CBAM). 
  3. Register for the CBAM in collaboration with customs.  
  4. Calculate direct and indirect emissions for their products, and determine if actual emissions can be calculated, or whether they should rely on default values. 
  5. Set up systems for CBAM administration, quarterly reports, yearly declarations, and the verification of embedded emissions. 
  6. Calculate and be ready to absorb the financial impact. 
  7. Keep an eye on carbon pricing developments in other countries (since carbon prices paid outside of the EU can be adjusted).  
  8. Actively work to improve business and contact suppliers to reduce carbon emissions and create a sustainable supply chain. Evaluate if a complete supply chain overhaul is needed or if there is a need for some new partnerships.  
  9. Monitor future CBAM developments closely.  

CBAM requires businesses to re-evaluate their strategies. It goes beyond mere adherence to regulations, spurring companies to re-examine their supply chain strategies and overall business processes to incorporate technologies that are more efficient in reducing greenhouse gases.

***

[1] How developing countries can measure exposure to the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, World Bank: https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/how-developing-countries-can-measure-exposure-eus-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism.
[2] Impacts of the CBAM on EU trade partners: consequences for developing countries, Taylor & Francis: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2023.2200758.
[3] EU’s trade-focused climate policy seen as ‘new tariff barrier’ in China economic circles, SCMP: https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3227326/eus-trade-focused-climate-policy-seen-new-tariff-barrier-china-economic-circles.
[4] India plans to challenge EU carbon tax at WTO, Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-plans-challenge-eu-carbon-tax-wto-sources-2023-05-16.
[5] India prepares own carbon trading system and decarbonisation measures to counter EU’s CBAM, Business Line: https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-prepares-own-carbon-trading-system-and-decarbonisation-measures-to-counter-eus-cbam/article67212862.ece.
[6] Impact of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, KPMG: https://kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2022/08/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-impacts.html.
[7] Ibid.

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Author

Mekhla Jha

Mekhla Jha is Research Manager in the International Trade Research program at the Hinrich Foundation with multi-sectoral experience in business strategy development, management consulting, public policy, research, and international relations.

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