In mid-September, the Biden-Harris administration said it would use executive authority to kill the so-called de minimis loophole, a law that allows shipments up to US$800 to enter the US duty-free.
The White House, from where Vice President Kamala Harris is waging a neck-to-neck campaign against Donald Trump to win the Presidency in elections this November, made plain its intended target: China’s e-commerce juggernauts, on which Washington lays blame for using the "loophole" to sidestep tariffs on hundreds of millions of de minimis shipments a year.
Coming in an especially febrile election season, this latest US démarche on trade struggles to articulate a clear rationale. It was meant to demonstrate the administration’s pro-worker and tough-on-China bona fides. But it also epitomizes the bipartisan unwillingness to craft a more targeted approach to economic competition with China.
In effect, the consequence of ending duty-free e-commerce for small shipments will be to increase prices, especially on lower-income consumers. It will add to the burden on US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) whilst producing only limited benefits for a small group of US manufacturers, most of whom can’t match Chinese prices.
E-commerce with Chinese characteristics
The de minimis provision, known officially as Section 321 of the Tariff Act of 1930, was designed for a very different world. The original intent was to avoid inconveniencing US tourists carrying souvenirs home.
With the rise of seamless global e-commerce, de minimis provisions in the US and indeed globally play an important role in exempting low-value goods from unnecessary paperwork and costs, thereby fueling the growth of small and medium-sized exporters.
Once a relatively obscure area of US trade law, de minimis has become widely politicized as a loophole used by Chinese e-commerce giants, among them notably Temu and Shein, which ship discounted clothing, cosmetics, and all manner of consumer goods worldwide. Like a growing number of other Chinese-origin multinationals, Shein has made efforts to internationalize its corporate identity by incorporating its headquarters in Singapore.
They remain Chinese in one key aspect: the ability to combine an ultra-cheap product base overwhelmingly sourced from China with low-cost shipping and ubiquitous marketing. This has allowed the upstart Chinese competitors to take on the likes of Amazon on its home turf. The Chinese companies can take cost minimization to extremes. Temu has provoked obloquy on Chinese social media for its punishing work hours and is known for its willingness to sustain short-term losses to gain global market share.
Temu’s parent PDD originally had a domestic focus. The prolonged slowdown in the Chinese economy and gravitational pull of US and European consumer markets, the top two by expenditure in the world, made international expansion inevitable.
The US$800 de minimis threshold, which is very high relative to most other jurisdictions, was also particularly attractive given the business models of Chinese e-commerce. Unlike Amazon and other retail giants that agglomerate goods from bulk shipment in local warehouses, Temu and Shein typically ship directly to consumers. The result is that a much larger proportion of their sales benefit from de minimis.
Covid-19 lockdowns impelled the extraordinary growth of e-commerce and de minimis shipments. CBP data shows that 1 billion de minimis shipments worth US$54 billion entered the US in 2023, double the level in 2019.1
Roughly 60% of these shipments originate from China, with over half of these coming directly from Temu and Shein.
Bargain basement runs afoul of geopolitics
The proposed US executive actions, backed by calls for legislation, are to be implemented after a period for public comment period. They would render ineligible for de minimis any items subject to tariffs under existing US law, irrespective of value.
The White House has noted that current tariff regimes cover 40% of US imports and 70% of Chinese apparel and textile imports, a major focus of the executive action.
The new rules are a victory for the hawkish House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and a smorgasbord of union and industry groups. The campaign run by these groups won out over lobbying from businesses including those in the National Association of Manufacturers and US Chamber of Commerce.
Who loses? Research published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in June indicates lower-income zip codes are more likely to import de minimis shipments. "Eliminating Section 321 would reduce aggregate welfare by US$11.8-$14.3 billion and disproportionately hurt lower-income and minority consumers," economists Pablo Fajgelbaum and Amit Khandelwal said in the paper.2
But anti-China sentiment now runs so deep that de minimis has been blamed for everything from the proliferation of fentanyl to goods produced using forced labor.
Some of the arguments might be defensible. However, a more realistic explanation for the White House decision, which came after years of pressure to end de minimis from antitrade and anti-China sentiment, is the protectionist impulses mounting in the run-up to a key election.
The emergence of organized labor targeting cheap Chinese goods was always going to be political catnip in an election that will be won or lost in predominantly rust-belt swing states.
The administration’s official announcement offers an even bigger claim, saying that American textile and apparel producers play a "critical role in the US defense industrial base".3 The implicit rationale is that the US military cannot be left dependent on foreign, and particularly Chinese, clothing. It’s hard not to detect a faint whiff of Dr. Strangelove in the declaration.
Whether senior members of the Biden administration are genuinely exercised by the risk of US Marines wearing Chinese-made jocks is beside the point. The fact that the administration is using dubious national-security rationalization to protect industries like textiles, which have been in secular decline for decades, is symptomatic of how deeply parochial interests are distorting the formation of sound US economic strategy on China.
High-end semiconductors, artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, an critical minerals might have more genuine bearing on the future of US economic and national security.
However, with trade once again the whipping boy in a difficult election, the administration has reverted to broad protectionism. The White House blocking of a bid by Japan’s Nippon Steel to acquire US Steel, the jettisoning of the trade pillar of Biden’s signature Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, and the floundering initiatives to elevate cooperation with the European Union on critical minerals, are all cases in point.
Neither political campaign in the elections has been able to articulate a coherent vision of which goods should be made locally and which should be sourced from friendly jurisdictions, or even which jurisdictions really are "friendly". A considerable proportion of manufactured goods are irrelevant to national security. Most textiles surely are as strategic as yoghurt, which France 20 years ago deemed so to prevent a foreign takeover of dairy giant Danone.
Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo has often defended protectionism with the claim that "American workers and businesses can outcompete anyone on a level playing field". There are surely some sectors in which competition is simply not worth the candle.
Conclusion
The overriding reason Temu and Shein products have been so popular is because of their price point. The decision to limit de minimis treatment is particularly counterintuitive given the political dominance of cost-of-living concerns.
The biggest winners of the executive action are Amazon and similar US retailers – not always pro-labor, it has to be said – as well as remnant textile companies that may enjoy a marginal reprieve.
If the US is indeed in a competition to win the 21st century, it sometimes isn’t clear if it is planning to win the race or just the votes.
This article was amended on 1 October to correct an attribution to Shein as originally having a domestic focus.
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[1] Garland, "What would the demise of de minimis mean for supply chains", Supplychaindive.
[2] https://www.nber.org/papers/w32607
[3] Fact Sheet op. cit.
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