WTO World Trade Report 2024: Trade and Inclusiveness

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Chapter A: Introduction

1. Developing economies are catching up to advanced economies and advanced economies continue to move ahead; this global economic convergence is possible because the world is more open and integrated, driven by both declining transport and communications costs, but also by decreasing trade barriers and increasing economic cooperation, underpinned by a rules-based international economic system; some economies that have yet to share in expanding growth as they are unable to harness trade potential and comparative advantages; more can and should be done domestically and internationally to achieve inclusive global trade. (pp. 18, 21) 
2. Varying levels of global integration mirror varying levels of wealth, living standards, and technological progress  – the richer and more advanced economies often are the most open and integrated; today’s unevenly globalized world is an unequal world. (p. 19) 
3. The newest, fastest, and largest phase of economic catch-up has been called the “great convergence” as most of the world’s population is becoming relatively more equal as billions of people rapidly move up the growth, technology, and development ladder (p. 19) 
4. High income and emerging economies have seen their living standards steadily advance in recent decades; the world economy is growing, developing, and converging at an unprecedented rate, although developing economies’ average per capita output is still significantly lower than that of advanced economies. (pp. 20-21, Figure A.1) 

5. Declining physical and policy-induced trade costs has fueled exponential growth in world trade; between 1950 and 2022 annual merchandise trade grew 5.4% annually; new sectors like services, digitally-delivered trade, and renewable energy goods trade have grown at 8.2% annually since 2005; with this expansion of trade has come a widening and deepening of global integration; almost all of the fast-developing economies of the past 40 years have used integration into the global trading system to drive sustained growth, including by increasing access to the most critical growth input - technology. (pp. 22-23, Figures A.2-A.3) 
6. Trade is necessary but not sufficient for fast growth: successful economies also implement domestic policies to leverage comparative advantages, facilitate connectivity to global markets, promote economic adjustment, and cushion adverse impacts of structural change; the correlation between trade and total employment tends to be positive; many of the world’s most successful and durable trade powers are also some of the most equal in income distribution and living standards; WTO members experienced a faster drop in poverty than non-WTO members; developing economies acceding to the WTO and implementing more ambitious domestic reforms grew faster than members who did not. (pp. 24-26, Figure A.4-A.5) 
7. While many countries have experienced rapid growth, others are stalled or falling behind; one reason is their inability, for both internal and external reasons, to use trade as a pathway to integration in the global economy or to leverage their existing access to move up the value-added ladder, diversify exports, and drive rapid growth. (p. 26)  

Chapter B: Trade and income convergence

1. The past 30 years of globalization has led to income convergence with the world becoming more equal, accompanied by a stark reduction in the global poverty rate; this period coincides with a steep increase in trade participation, with low- and middle-income economies becoming dominant in global merchandise trade; one-third of economies, concentrated mostly in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, did not converge, with three-quarters of those economies exhibiting below average trade participation and the remaining quarter with slow income growth despite high trade participation due to their role as commodity exporters; there are significant differences in the degree and scope of trade participation between fast growing economies and those lagging behind; trade participation and diversification are intertwined with the production activity of MNCs. (pp. 32-34, Figures B.1-B.2, Table B.1) 

2. Sustained and inclusive income growth is driven by improvements in economy-wide labor productivity through investing in human and physical capital, adoption of new technologies, and structural transformation shifting employment to more productive sectors and firms; outward-oriented policies that avoid protectionism and attract foreign investment have underpinned the success of fast-growing developing economies; trade and investment openness boosts structural transformation and productivity growth. (p. 35)  
3. Export-led transformation increases aggregate productivity, drawing workers into more productive firms and activities and improving productivity in exporting firms by enabling economies of scale and incentivizing adoption of new technologies; Viet Nam’s experience provides an example of how export-led transformation has driven growth. (pp. 35-37, Box B.1) 
4. Improved access to imported products and import competition can enhance productivity in domestic firms and industries and lead to higher productivity and increased innovation; participation in global value chains and FDI facilitate the diffusion and adoption of new technologies, improve productivity of locally owned buyers and suppliers, and upgrade exports; the mere presence of MNEs does not guarantee spillovers of tacit knowledge; technology transfer needs an adequate institutional environment, openness, and investment into education and research; trade cost reductions and resulting trade expansion has accelerated income convergence, especially in low income economies; Costa Rica’s experience is an example of how FDI has driven economic diversification and upgrading. (pp. 37-40, Box B.2, Figure B.3) 
5. Some developing economies have gained little from globalization; economies with slow growth show low trade participation, are dependent on commodity exports and receive little FDI; barriers to trade, including trade policy barriers, (e.g., subsidies, import tariffs, services trade barriers) regulatory measures (e.g., rules of origin, SPS, and TBT compliance), a lack of participation in regional trade agreements with high income countries and lack of implementation of trade facilitating measures, hinder economic convergence; under-developed infrastructure, geographical challenges, and weak rule of law and contract enforcement impede sustained economic development; reducing remittance and trade finance costs and making trade finance more available aid in development. (pp. 40-48; Figures B.4-B.8, Boxes B.3-B.4) 
6. Economies specializing or dependent on commodities production as their main source of exports can struggle to achieve sustained growth and economic convergence due to commodity price volatility, a lack of economic diversification, and increased inequality within the domestic economy; enhancing the resilience of public finances and adopting a long-term perspective is crucial to leverage commodity exports sustainably; over-reliance on single commodity exports, market power of large global commodity buyers, and tariff escalation in export markets can limit economic diversification; government can help economies to diversify through industrial policies, export promotion, and complimentary domestic policies. (pp. 48-51) 
7. Domestic institutions and policies reducing economic efficiency and slowing structural transformation can reduce the ability of trade to accelerate economic growth; these can include poorly functioning capital, labor, and land markets, barriers to FDI and technology transfer; economies can attract FDI by improving local workforce skills, infrastructure, adopting a robust IP regime, and through investment facilitation; special economic zones (SEZs) can serve as a stepping stone to improving infrastructure and the regulatory environment, though successfully using SEZs can also pose challenges. (pp. 51-54, Figure B.9, Box B.5) 

8. Future economic convergence faces threats from trends such as geopolitical tensions, the digital revolution, and climate change, which are all changing the landscape of trade-led development; these trends may also present new opportunities for convergence, but positive or negative outcomes depend on policy choices to manage risks while leveraging new opportunities to foster inclusive and resilient economic growth; geopolitical tensions leading to decoupling could result in a significant drop in global trade while tensions that threaten established supply chains lead to efficiency losses and higher production costs. (p. 55)  
9. The digital revolution can enable new opportunities for services trade-led development, making services more tradable and accelerating growth; digitalization and new digital technologies can lead to substantial growth and new opportunities; the digital divide in infrastructure and skills threatens the ability of low- and middle-income countries to engage in new opportunities, AI-related productivity growth depends on an economy’s readiness; factors like automation and robotics can devalue sources of comparative advantage of developing countries. (pp. 56-59; Figures B.10-B.11)

Chapter C: Trade and inclusiveness within economies

1. Trade raises overall incomes and reduces poverty without necessarily increasing inequality; over the past 30 years, the expansion of trade has substantially decreased poverty and slightly decreased income inequality (though it remains high in absolute terms) while some large economies face rising inequality; trade may increase or decrease inequality within an economy, but its overall impact on inequality is small. (pp. 68-70, Figures C.1-C.3, Box C.1) 
2. Most people gain from trade but some lose if they are exposed to distortions and barriers that limit their ability to access foreign markets; the distribution of gains from trade among workers is unequal and depends on redistribution within economies from relatively less productive to more productive firms, sectors, or regions, though evidence suggests that a majority of workers benefits from trade; specialization according to comparative advantage leads to gains from trade that are distributed unequally among workers depending on the industry and region in which they are employed, occupations, and skillsets; winners from trade may change over time; offshoring is linked to increased wage inequality and can explain why trade is associated with an increase in the skills premium in developing economies. (pp. 71-74; Figures C.5-C.6, Box C.2) 

3. Gains from trade arise because trade allows productive firms to expand and benefit from economies of scale; the self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting increases the difference between large and small firms, impacting individual inequality; large productive firms dominate exports and imports and respond better to import competition; larger firms concentrating in trade affect inequality because they pay higher wages and hire more skilled employees; differences between import-competing and trading firms can raise both the skill premium and the inequality between workers with similar skill levels; trade can also widen urban-rural wage inequality; gender inequality can worsen disparities between workers with similar skill levels. (pp. 74-75) 
4. Trade affects employment, wages, and job quality, including by improving working conditions, reducing child labor, and creating economic conditions where families are less dependent on the earnings of their children; the net impact of trade on individual workers is a combination of the impacts of import competition, access to foreign inputs, and export opportunities: there are a large number of potential impacts that trade may have on workers, and the effects of trade on workers will be different across economies and even across similar individuals, and is also affected by the ability of workers to adjust to effects of trade. (pp. 75-76) 
5. Trade benefits consumers by making a cheaper, more diverse set of products available, resulting in welfare gains that can counter inequality-increasing effects on the labor market and disproportionately benefit low-income households due to their relatively higher spending on imported products and their sensitivity to price changes; the positive consumption effects of trade, even for most workers, likely impact a larger number of people than the negative labor market effects, as a limited share of the population is affected by import competition; consumption gains from trade favor the poorer segments of developing economies’ population more. (pp. 76-78, Box C.3, Figure C.7) 
6. Distortions and barriers are significant and varied, disproportionately affect certain groups, and can lead to concentrated and persistent losses for some individuals; the impact of distortions and barriers can be large, even in high income economies; various conditions can hinder openness to trade, limit the reach of gains from trade, and prevent adjustment to trade shocks, including:
    
   • high degrees of labor market informality;  
   • firms with high levels of market power not passing lower costs on to workers and consumers and reducing the ability of workers to move towards opportunities; 
   • the presence of SOEs;  
   • underdeveloped capital markets; 
   • excessively restrictive labor market regulations impeding workers from moving towards more productive firms and sectors; 
   • barriers to education limiting the ability to adjust to trade shocks;  
   • weak institutions lowering the gains from trade through inefficient contracting arrangements; 
   • high internal trade costs muting the impact of trade on prices and limiting access to export opportunities;  
   • high degrees of regional concentration impeding adjustment to trade shocks; 
   • barriers to the flow of information, including about job and export opportunities, which reduce trade, limit price declines, and hinder export growth; and  
   • norms, habits, and local identities that hamper openness to trade. (pp. 78-82) 
7. Distortions and barriers disproportionately affect certain groups to their detriment, includingmicro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), unskilled workers, workers in rural or remote areas, and women, who gain less from trade because of economy-wide frictions and their specific constraints to accessing international markets or adjusting to trade shocks:
   
   
   • for MSMEs, barriers like limited access to capital, obstacles to obtaining information, distributional costs, and the market power of large firms limit their capacity to export;
   • women are stymied by income inequality, limited access to capital, obstacles raised by norms applicable to women, and barriers to information, making women-owned firms less likely to engage in trade and less able to adjust to trade shocks;
   • inequality between regions within an economy can be large, especially in trade, and rural areas are negatively affected by underdeveloped infrastructure, information frictions and market power of intermediaries, while workers in rural areas displaced by import competition have more challenges adapting due to limited alternative employment options;
   • exporters tend to put a higher premium on skills, limiting gains from trade for low- and un-skilled workers, while certain norms, restricted access to capital, strong correlations between low-skill and working in the informal sector, and restricted access to capital also reduce their gains from trade; (pp. 82- 86, Figures C.8-C.11)
8. Fairer trade policies and complementary domestic policies are crucial to make trade more inclusive; tariffs and non-tariff measures have uneven effects on individuals, with low-income households and women facing higher tariffs on their consumption; protectionist trade measures intended to protect certain groups of workers tends to be ineffective, and can raise costs in downstream sectors, offsetting positive employment impacts on protected industries; export restrictions tend to be ineffective as they trigger retaliatory responses; inclusive trade policies, including to address biases in tariffs or NTMs, can address distortions and barriers that hinder equal participation; trade openness can address market-based distortions. (pp. 86-88)
9. Domestic policy reforms, not only trade policy reforms, are essential to address inequality and make trade more inclusive; reforming taxation, education, and social protection policies in particular can affect the fundamental aspects of an economy and society that contribute to inequality and inclusiveness; labor market policies like unemployment benefits, income support, training and job search assistance, reducing highly restrictive dismissal costs, and addressing excessive market power can help with adjustments to trade shocks and distribute gains from trade more evenly. (pp. 88-91; Figure C.12)

10. Structural macroeconomic trends - the digital revolution, climate change, and geopolitical tensions - affecting both trade flows and within-economy inequality will transform inclusive trade:
     
    • Digitalization can democratize international trade by providing access and opportunities to more participants; yet, a significant digital divide between and within economies remains, creating additional burdens and reducing trade opportunities, especially for certain groups like women and the poor and underprivileged; digitalization and new tools like artificial intelligence, while having a positive impact on labor productivity, could exacerbate inequality;   
    • Climate change is expected to impact trade negatively and worsen within-economy inequality; the global shift towards renewable energy sources and sustainable practices has reshaped trade dynamics; international trade can play a pivotal role in mitigating the impacts of climate change while also addressing within-country inequality ;  
    • Geopolitical tensions disrupt trade and undermine inclusiveness efforts – fragmentation risks progress made in reducing poverty and inequality, particularly for vulnerable groups like women, low-income households, and MSMEs.  (pp. 91-94, Box C.5)

Chapter D: Inclusive trade and international cooperation; Chapter E: Conclusions

1. The WTO has contributed to income convergence by reducing trade barriers, increasing the predictability of trade policy, boosting trade flows and reducing their volatility, and fostering reforms and good governance, but participation has been uneven; WTO commitments have contributed to trade and economic growth and helped to diversify both exports and imports; making strong WTO commitments helps avoid mutually-damaging beggar-thy-neighbor policies, and enhances the credibility of trade policy reform programs; non-discrimination provisions foster the development of all members, leveraging their comparative advantages; GATT/WTO membership has boosted trade between members by 140 percent; lower trade policy uncertainty has also played an important role in facilitating imports; low-income economies have higher tariff flexibilities but also greater tariff uncertainty and use their flexibilities to raise their applied MFN tariffs more extensively; the economic growth effect of WTO accession depends on the extent of WTO commitments. (pp. 98-102, Figures D.1-D.5) 

2. The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) has boosted trade and contributed to economic convergence; least-developed countries (LDCs) have benefited disproportionately from the TFA, with export increases at 2.4 percent; low-income economies may not derive much benefit from the TRIPS Agreement because of challenges with its implementation as these economies lack the absorptive capacity and complementary infrastructure needed to benefit from enhanced IP regimes. (pp. 101-102) 
3. LDCs and developing economies are allowed flexibilities under the WTO commitments - special and differential treatment (S&DT) – but evidence on their use and effects is limited; there are six different types of S&DT provisions, designed to increase trade opportunities, safeguard trade interests, offer flexibility in commitments, provide longer transition periods, and ensure that technical assistance is provided; economic arguments including low levels of economic and technological sophistication, high costs of compliance, and the extent of market failures support offering flexibilities to developing economies; some flexibilities, depending on design, could undermine the predictability and value of commitments; S&DT provisions have drawbacks, including imbalances in market access commitments compared to high-income economies; some factors hinder the use of S&DT provisions, though evidence is limited likely because of capacity issues; views of WTO members differ on S&DT provisions. (pp. 101-107, Boxes D.1-D.2) 
4. The participation of low-income economies in the WTO has increased over time but remains limited, as developing members face financial and human resource constraints that hinder their ability to participate actively, including in WTO committees, propose measures, and monitor potentially harmful policies of other trading partners; LDCs and smaller economies tend to participate in WTO negotiations as a group; low- and middle-income members have initiated fewer dispute proceedings than other WTO members, and have participated primarily as third parties; there are WTO rules and resources to facilitate the participation of lower-income WTO members.  (pp. 107-109, D.6-D.9) 
5. The WTO can help economies that have not fully benefitted from trade; this requires greater international cooperation and WTO support in the face of current tensions; maintaining an open and predictable multilateral trading system is essential to support trade-led economic convergence; reducing trade costs, re-establishing a fully functional dispute resolution system, and enhancing transparency and information sharing help to maintain an open and predictable trading system; a fully functional and accessible dispute settlement system is crucial for enabling low-income economies with limited bargaining power to participate as complainants and respondents; enhancing transparency and information-sharing can further improve policy decision-making, business operations, and investor confidence in low-income economies; economies joining the WTO can use the accession process to reform their economies in order to improve access to imports, increase FDI, and enhance good governance. (pp. 110-111) 
6. Economies must address both their own trade barriers and those imposed by others to fully capitalize on future trade opportunities and support economic convergence; while services-led growth is increasingly seen as a new path to development, services sectors face significant trade restrictions, especially in lower-income economies, necessitating the combination of market-opening negotiations with international cooperation on regulatory issues to reduce barriers; greater cooperation on digital trade could benefit less integrated or diversified low-income economies, whose participation in digital trade remains limited, providing new trade opportunities and supporting greater economic convergence; preparing developing economies for digital trade requires a comprehensive and multifaceted strategy including both domestic and international mobilization, such as international initiatives leveraging specific expertise of different international organizations to catalyze more inclusive digital trade.  (pp. 111-113) 
7. Coordinated investment policies can contribute to economic convergence by reducing trade costs, supporting infrastructure development, and fostering innovation; although low-income economies only receive a small share of FDI, they can benefit significantly from improvements in investment facilitation; agricultural trade patterns are heavily distorted by both tariffs and domestic support, though reducing domestic support could help LDCs more than reducing tariffs; international cooperation is needed to discipline or discourage the use of export restrictions and tariff escalation affecting trade in raw materials and to find alternative approaches as export restrictions are not regulated by the WTO. (pp. 113-115) 
8. International cooperation can help low-income economies overcome the challenges that hinder them from implementing their trade agreements, especially through S&DT implementation in the TBT and SPS agreements including training and technical assistance; full implementation of the TFA could boost the participation of LDCs in trade but LDCs must overcome capacity constraints, resource limitations, and technology gaps; greater collaboration among assistance partners is needed to accelerate TFA implementation in low-income economies, especially to strengthen trade-related infrastructure and improve digital connectivity. (pp. 115-116) 
9. The TFA’s S&DT provisions mark a significant shift from the WTO’s past approach and can serve as a blueprint for future agreements, offering a flexibilities package without exemptions and allowing developing economies and LDCs to establish their own implementation timetables based on capacity; greater support can help low-income economies implement an IP regime that responds to their needs; low-income economies can take steps to maximize the benefits of IP protection by investing in education, developing infrastructure to support innovation, and engaging in international cooperation; technical assistance is available through the WTO, WIPO, and other international organizations; modern Aid for Trade financing through new models and approaches is necessary  as traditional development finance is under stress; developing countries are working through the G-90 to advance S&DT negotiations to support industrialization efforts while minimizing the risk of legal retaliation; a comprehensive analysis of potential changes would help in improving the effectiveness of S&DT. (pp. 116-118) 
10. Trade inclusiveness within economies seeks to make the WTO’s benefits and opportunities accessible to all individuals and businesses; poverty reduction, inequality and inclusiveness are issues repeatedly raised and taken into consideration at the WTO, driven partly by concerns that rising inequality and the perception that trade is leaving certain groups behind could lead to a backlash against trade; trade and trade policies can have notable distributional effects and the WTO can contribute to these effects; WTO accession can contribute to poverty reduction in acceding economies; further research on the impact of WTO membership would be valuable to identify and quantify specific mechanisms. (pp. 118-119, Figure D.10) 

11. WTO disciplines do not restrict the use of most domestic inclusion policies, like training and job search assistance and unemployment insurance, to address the distributional impact of trade; other tools are subject to WTO disciplines, though tariffs, subsidies, and safeguards may sometimes be used to protect jobs at risk from import competition; some WTO agreements explicitly address inclusiveness through provisions targeting MSMEs, though in the absence of specific provisions, aspects of WTO agreements can still support inclusiveness; the WTO Agreement on Agriculture has provisions contributing to food security, which is important to low-income groups, while the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies recognizes the needs of fisherfolk in developing economies and LDCs; the TFA can benefit MSMEs by simplifying and streamlining international trade procedures and improving information availability; discussions on inclusive trade and trade-related technical and capacity-building initiatives specifically focused on women and MSMEs are gaining traction in the WTO, including in committees and working groups; poverty reduction, women’s economic empowerment and MSMEs’ participation are increasingly integrated into Aid for Trade programming; trade finance and development facilitation programs, including the Standards and Trade Development Facility, can benefit and enhance inclusive trade.  (pp. 119-122) 
12. The WTO can do more to foster inclusive trade and growth for people and firms, including through strengthening the WTO and updating its rulebook; re-globalization through strengthened international cooperation can reduce poverty in less integrated and diversified economies and ensure that disadvantaged groups can participate in and benefit from trade; the WTO can strengthen information sharing, discussion of best practices, improve data collection and analysis, and increase participation from vulnerable groups to better reflect their perspectives and interests; the WTO can increase efforts to support food security. (pp. 122-124) 
13. Enhanced international cooperation can promote inclusive development; beyond trade policies, complimentary policies including on infrastructure, institutions, redistribution and competition are essential to foster inclusive development; international cooperation can strengthen economic resilience through coordinated trade policies, reducing trade barriers, facilitating smoother cross-border transactions, reducing negative shocks, and providing assistance to countries that experience negative trade shocks. (pp. 124-125) 
14. International cooperation is needed to harness the opportunities of the digital revolution, to build better infrastructure and digital connectivity, which will enhance trade capacity and lower trade costs;  FDI and international trade in IT-related goods and services play a pivotal role in the development of digital infrastructure; a robust regulatory framework is essential to safeguard consumer interests and facilitate the adoption of emerging technologies, and international cooperation is important for advancing the regulatory framework, with the WTO and other multilateral and regional institutions playing a significant role in promoting common regulations and standards; effective competition policy, enforcement, and cross-border collaboration among competition authorities can play a pivotal role in promoting inclusiveness by addressing dominant market positions in the digital economy; international coordination in taxation policies is essential to prevent tax evasion and ensure that trade contributes to inclusive development. (pp. 125-129) 
15. International cooperation is indispensable in addressing climate change and other environmental challenges on a global scale; international cooperation, finance, and trade are essential to building climate-resilient, low-carbon infrastructure, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and transition to low-carbon economies; coherence between trade and environmental policies is necessary for sustainability; actions to address climate change can be bolstered through finance and trade; finance is especially important for vulnerable developing countries to help in the transition to net zero, with several international initiatives like the Green Climate Fund already supporting developing economies; trade in critical goods and services enhances climate action by reducing costs and amplifying impact; international cooperation to combat corruption plays a crucial role in ensuring the benefits of trade, including revenues from exports of natural resources, are widely shared. (pp. 129-130) 
16. There is an ongoing debate about international cooperation on the introduction of labor and other inclusiveness considerations in trade policies to address within-economy inclusiveness, though existing ILO Declarations on trade and labor recognize that violating labor rights should not be used as a trade advantage and labor standards should not be misused for protectionist purposes; provisions addressing inclusiveness within economies are included in an increasing number of RTAs, while labor provisions are found in an increasing number of unilateral, preferential, bilateral, regional trade, and international investment agreements; some provisions of RTAs specifically target disadvantaged groups, promote social corporate responsibility, and target firms including MSMEs and artisans; there is limited empirical evidence of the effectiveness of labor and inclusiveness provisions in RTAs, and labor provisions are more likely to improve working conditions or have positive effects on trade when combined with appropriate accompanying measures; recent WTO ministerial declarations indicate more focused discussion on labor-related trade measures at the WTO in the future.  (pp. 130-135, Figure D.11, Boxes D.4-D.5)
17. Two misleading assumptions still underlie the debate about the effect of globalization on inclusiveness between and within economies: that trade is detrimental to development and inclusiveness, and that WTO rules prevent governments from adopting ambitious development and inclusiveness policies; in reality, trade has played a crucial role in reducing poverty and in enabling income convergence, though trade has benefitted some individuals, regions, and economies more than others; nothing in the WTO agreements restricts the use of non-discriminatory policies for development or inclusiveness, but trade alone is not enough to create a more resilient and inclusive global economy. (pp. 138-140)

Conclusion

The World Trade Report 2024 powerfully links trade to income and economic growth at a time when there are more concerns than ever over the negative effects of globalization. The Report is highly useful for policymakers seeking to bolster their case for a return to fruitful international cooperation and negotiation and essential reading for those doubting the value of globalization.

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